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INTRODUCTION
Despite the nationwide availability of cheap consumer
products and services in the marketplace, consumers lacked an
inexpensive and suitable forum in which to bring small claims.
Beginning in the latter part of the twentieth century, these claims
found a home in federal class action, governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP or Rule) 23. Class action litigation was
designed to provide an efficient mechanism for multiple claims with
common questions of law or fact to be brought as a single litigation
unit. Subsection (b)(3) of Rule 23 permits consumers who have
suffered relatively minor harms to bring their claims en masse, greatly
defraying the cost of litigation.
 Juris Doctor, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Executive Articles Editor, CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014;
B.A., Political Science and History, Miami University, 2007. I would like to thank
Professor Hal Morris for his guidance and support. I would also like to thank my
parents, George and Cynthia Pauwels, for their unyielding encouragement.
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Basic economic principles dictate that potential plaintiffs who
suffer monetary harm are unlikely to sue when the cost of litigating
would result in nothing more than a pyrrhic victory. This economic
disincentive is heightened when only de minimus monetary harms are
at stake. An example of this type of class action claim comes from the
District Court for the District of New Jersey. In Katz v. Live Nation
Inc., Live Nation customers filed a class action suit against the
company for charging a mandatory six-dollar parking fee for each
ticket, regardless of whether a ticket buyer drove to the venue.1 These
fees, when considered individually, were far too small to justify an
individual bringing a lawsuit to vindicate his rights, but represented a
large source of revenue for Live Nation, which benefited not from the
size of the fee, but rather from the number of consumers charged.2
Commentators have viewed recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence as tightening the requirements to survive class
certification3––yet another move by a business-friendly court to curb
consumer protections.4 One Supreme Court decision, Comcast v.
Behrend,5 has sparked controversy in the realm of class action
litigation by refining the predominance rules around damage classes.6
1

Katz, et al. v. Live Nation Inc., No. 09–3740 (MLC), 2010 WL 2539686, at
*1 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2010). The case settled in 2014 for: (1) three (3) free lawn tickets
to a Free Ticket Event, as described in sub-section 6(a) below; and (2) a coupon code
for a five dollar ($5.00) discount on ticket purchases. Amended Class Settlement
Agreement And Release, 12, ECF. No. 85-1.
2
Amended Class Settlement Agreement And Release 8, ECF. No. 85-1 (noting
there are 362,928 class members).
3
Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729
(2013).
4
Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
(May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-businessdecisions-are-defining-this-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
Corporations and the Court, THE ECONOMIST, (June 23, 2011),
www.economist.com/node/18866873; Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard
Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013).
5
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
6
Damages classes are those classes that seek classwide damages in addition to
the other common questions of law or fact that the class has been organized for.
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This Note’s purpose is to look at how the Seventh Circuit has
approached predominance7 through the lens of Butler v. Sears,
Roebuck, and Co. II8 (Sears II) following the Supreme Court’s
decision to vacate and remand Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. I.9
Three questions will direct this discussion: How did the Seventh
Circuit apply the Court’s analysis to the facts of Sears II? Did the
Seventh Circuit correctly interpret the majority decision to only apply
to classes seeking classwide damages, or were they incorrectly swayed
by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent? To what extent are the circuit courts
divided on how to apply Comcast?
Part I of the note will provide background information on class
actions generally, including a brief review of the development of the
predominance requirement. Part I will also provide the facts of Sears
II and, the case’s procedural history through the federal court system.
Part II will review the analysis the Seventh Circuit used in its Sears II
decision and discuss whether the court correctly interpreted Comcast
in light of Sears II’s facts. Part III will look beyond the Seventh
Circuit to the other circuits that have had the opportunity to review
predominance in light of Comcast and consider whether, and to what
degree, those courts agree with the Seventh Circuit. Part III will also
look to how the district courts sitting within the Seventh Circuit have
analyzed predominance. Finally, Part IV will offer my conclusions on
the Seventh Circuit’s Comcast application and its implications for the
future of class action litigation in the Seventh Circuit.

7

The predominance inquiry found in Rule 23(b)(3) asks whether individual
questions of fact or law will “overwhelm questions common to the class.” Comcast
v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013). Where “proposed classes are sufficiently
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation,” the predominance test is
satisfied and class certification should be granted. Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
8
727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013).
9
702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2012).
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I. BACKGROUND
While the introductory paragraphs have discussed the basic
reasons for having the class mechanism built into the federal rules, a
more thorough discussion of the development of class actions and their
current role will help frame the later conversation.
A. The development of Rule 23 and class action jurisprudence (1938 –
present)
Rule 23 is a deviation from the general rule that litigation must
be “conducted by and on behalf of the named parties only.”10 While
class actions were included in the original 1938 Federal Rules, the
class action framework we know today is the result of “a bold and
well-intentioned [revision in 1966 designed] to encourage more
frequent use of class actions.”11 While the revisions did not initially
spur a spate of collective litigation, the courts eventually took a liking
to the tool in the mid-1980s when forced to respond to “dockets
clogged with mass tort cases.”12
For the next fifteen to twenty years, class actions became a
popular method for trying common claims. Two major factors created
the conditions for Rule 23’s booming acceptance. First, high paydays
encouraged plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek out potential class
representative plaintiffs.13 Second, the high stakes of class litigation
forced defendants to settle rather than “risk a potentially bankrupting
judgment” at trial.14 The impulse to settle was strengthened by the lack
of interlocutory review, now permitted under Rule 23(f), which forced

10

Walmart v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)).
11
Charles A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970).
12
Klonoff, supra note 3, at 736.
13
Id. at 737–38.
14
Id.
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defendants to wait until final judgment to challenge class
certification.15
Class action plaintiffs in recent years have suffered setbacks in
Congress, with the Class Action Fairness Act, and with recent
decisions in the United States Supreme Court. In 2005, Congress
enacted the Class Action Fairness Act.16 The Act had two goals:
reduce forum shopping by expanding the diversity jurisdiction rules to
permit cases with minimum diversity17 where the collective amount in
controversy exceeds five million dollars; and enhance review of class
action settlements for fairness.18 The Act was intended to sweep truly
national class actions into the federal courts, while preserving the state
courts for disputes of a more local character under the “home state
exception.”19 Congress believed plaintiffs were filing lawsuits in state
courts known to be unfriendly for defendants and escaping removal by
including non-diverse parties in the suits.20 While having the added
benefit of helping defendant corporations that preferred a federal
15

Id. Rule 23(f) reads: “APPEALS. A court of appeals may permit an appeal
from an order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a
petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after
the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless
the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.”
16
Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4-14 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–
1715).
17
Minimum diversity exists where at least one defendant is diverse from at
least one plaintiff. It stands in contrast to the general diversity rule, 28 U.S.C. §
1332, which requires that no plaintiff be from the same state as any defendant.
18
Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996).
19
Jeffrey Roether, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA's Jurisdictional
Burden Of Proof In Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745,
2760–61 (2007).
20
The Class Action Fariness Act, Five Years Later, (April 12, 2010),
www.mayerbrown.com/news/the-class-action-fariness-act-five-years-later-04-122010/. Essentially, plaintiffs’ attorneys would add non-diverse class representatives,
simply to eliminate complete diversity, a death-knell to diversity jurisdiction in
federal court at the time. By adding a non-diverse class representative or defendant
to the mix, the class could proceed in state court without fear of removal to federal
court, which lacked subject matter jurisdiction without complete diversity.
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forum, the main goal of the Class Action Fairness Act was to prevent
these forum selection abuses.21 On the whole, the Act has been
successful at driving large class actions into federal forums, though
forum shopping now takes place among the federal district courts
rather than among the states.22
Recent Supreme Court decisions have further curtailed class
plaintiffs’ choices to bring their suits and obtain class certification.
Commenters point to five recent Supreme Court decisions––each
decided by a bare 5-4 majority with the same five justices in the
majority––that have fundamentally reshaped how class actions work in
the federal system.23 Through these five rulings, Stolt-Nelson, S.A. v.
Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, WalMart v. Dukes, Genesis Healthcare Corp v. Symczyk, and Comcast
Corp v. Behrend, the Court restricted class actions for claims rooted in
consumer contracts, employment contracts, and employment
discrimination; permitted defendants to offer settlements to individual
plaintiffs;24 and allowed for closer scrutiny of proposed classes before
certification.25 One case stands in contrast to these five in its ruling for
the plaintiffs seeking class certification: Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, where the court refused to expand
the amount of proof required to achieve class certification in securities
fraud claims based on the “fraud on the market” theory.26
With this backdrop in mind, the next subsection will review the
basics of class certification and what plaintiffs must allege and prove.

21

Id. See also, S. REP. NO. 109-14 at 10–27 (2005).
Id.
23
See, e.g., John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices,
and Wholesale Changes to Class Action Law, 13 WYO. L. REV. 463, 465 (2013).
24
Potentially destroying class certification by eliminating numerosity.
25
Id.
26
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
22
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B. Class certification requirements under Rule 23
In a Rule 23 evaluation, the court looks at several criteria to
determine the worthiness of a class for certification. The threshold
inquiry under Rule 23(a) depends on four elements: numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.27 These
elements require the plaintiff to show that there are enough potential
class members to warrant class certification, that there is a common
question of law or fact among the parties, that the claims of the named
plaintiff are typical of the rest of the class, and that the class counsel
will adequately represent the interests of the class.28 Once these
elements have been satisfied, the class must fit into one of the three
categories permitted under Rule 23(b). Subsection (b)(1), or limited
fund classes are where the total amount of damages for all potential
plaintiffs would exceed the defendant’s assets, thus creating
inconsistent standards of conduct for the defendant or affecting the
rights of other plaintiffs not parties to the individual suit.29 Subsection
(b)(2) classes are where the defendant’s conduct applies generally to
the class, so that injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate for the
whole class.30 Finally, subsection (b)(3) classes are where there are
common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual
issues such that class certification is “superior” to individual
litigation.31
This comment will focus on the 23(b)(3) classification and
specifically the predominance requirement therein. Predominance is a
question of efficiency.32 The purpose of the predominance requirement
is to make sure that the common questions of either law or fact are
central to the issue of liability before the court. Where efficiency is the
goal of the predominance test, common questions that only address
27

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997).
29
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
30
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2013).
31
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
32
See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615–16.
28
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ancillary or tangential issues of the litigation do not satisfy
predominance because the cost and complexities of class litigation far
outweigh the benefits obtained through combined litigation of
common issues. For class litigation to be efficient, the common issues
must move litigation far enough ahead such that only relatively minor
individual issues remain.
Thus, the predominance requirement is not fulfilled where
“individual questions . . . overwhelm questions common to the
class.”33 On the contrary, if common issues predominate, the
requirement is fulfilled and class certification can proceed. Where
there are only common questions among the class or there are no
common questions among the class, no in-depth predominance
analysis need be done.34 In cases where both common and individual
questions must be resolved, the court must consider several factors at
the subjective discretion of the district court.35
Three recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have looked
toward the predominance requirement in Rule 23; this Note’s purpose
is to review how the Seventh Circuit has approached predominance
through the lens of Sears II,36 following the Supreme Court’s decision
to vacate and remand Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. I.37 The Court
ordered the Seventh Circuit to reconsider the case in light of the
Court’s ruling in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,38 where the Court held
that “a damages suit cannot be certified to proceed as a class action
unless the damages sought are the result of the classwide injury that
the suit alleges.”39

33

Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct.
1184, 1193 (2013).
34
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. I, 702 F.3d 259, 361 (7th Cir. 2012)
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (mem.) (2013).
35
Id.
36
727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013).
37
702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2012).
38
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
39
Sears II, 727 F.3d at 799.
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C. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend and the effect on predominance
A group of plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging various antitrust violations
against Comcast Corporation for using a monopoly to charge supracompetitive prices on cables services in certain markets.40 The district
court granted class certification despite dismissing three of the four
antitrust claims as incapable of classwide proof.41 The court found that
Comcast’s activities created an impermissibly high barrier for new
entrants into the affected markets and recognized that the plaintiffs’
damages model was sufficient to measure the relief of the remaining
theory of liability.42
The Third Circuit, in a divided opinion, affirmed the findings
of the district court; Comcast filed and was granted certiorari in the
Supreme Court.43
1. Justice Scalia delivers the opinion for the Court
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the Court and
initially noted the necessity of the reviewing court to look beyond the
pleadings to the underlying facts of the case because “class
determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in
the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of
action.”44 Further, the Court notes that “addition[al] safeguards for
(b)(3) class members beyond those provided for (b)(1) and (b)(2),”
including the ability to opt-out of class litigation, indicate that courts
must take a more in-depth look at the predominance question before
certification is granted.45
40

Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430.
Id.
42
Id. at 1431.
43
Id. at 1431.
44
Id. at 1432 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.
Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011)).
45
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432.
41
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With those concepts in mind, the Court proceeded to look at
whether the district court properly granted class certification despite
relying on a damages model that relied on all four theories of relief,
rather than requiring the plaintiffs’ expert to tailor the damages model
to the remaining antitrust theory.46 Based on testimony of plaintiffs’
expert at a hearing in the trial court, the Court found that plaintiffs had
not shown that the plaintiffs’ damages model was capable of proving
that damages are able to be calculated.47 Thus, plaintiffs would have to
prove damages individually, destroying predominance of common
questions.48
Justice Scalia focused on the failure of the Third Circuit to
look into the merits of the case to determine the worthiness of the case
for class certification.49 Justice Scalia wrote:
The District Court and the Court of Appeals saw no
need for respondents to “tie each theory of antitrust
impact” to a calculation of damages. [Behrend v.
Comcast Corp.] 655 F.3d [182] at 206 [(3d Cir. 2011)].
That, they said, would involve consideration of the
“merits” having “no place in the class certification
inquiry.” Id. at 206-207. That reasoning flatly
contradicts our cases requiring a determination that
Rule 23 is satisfied, even when that requires inquiry
46

Id. at 1433.
Id. at 1434.
48
Id. at 1434–35. SCOTUSblog commentator Sergio Campos frames the issue
as whether the claims are susceptible to common answers or whether common
questions are all that are necessary for class certification. Sergio Campos, Opinion
analysis: No common ground, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 29, 2013, 4:30 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/opinion-analysis-no-common-ground. His
analysis relies on Amgen and Wal-Mart as proof of an on-going divide on the Court
as to what a plaintiff must prove to succeed on the question of predominance. Id. The
issue of whether a divide exists and, if so, which side is correct is not the subject of
this paper; the analysis moving forward accepts the majority decision in each case as
the rule of law.
49
Comcast, 144 S. Ct. at 1433.
47
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into the merits of the claim. Wal-Mart [Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2564 n.6 (2011).]50
Proceeding from the determination that the courts below had failed to
apply the correct depth of inquiry into the predominance question, the
Court applied the correct method and determined that “[t]here is no
question that the model failed to measure damages resulting from the
particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’ liability in this action is
premised.51
The failure, according to the Court, existed in the incongruity
between the claims that survived Comcast’s motion to dismiss and the
plaintiffs’ proposed method for calculating damages.52 While the
Third Circuit waived off Comcast’s concerns of incongruity, reasoning
that the damages model was not flawed at all,53 the Court looked to the
three remaining theories of liability the district court rejected, and
posited that those alternate theories may be the cause of the increased
prices in the market.54

50

Id. 1433.
Id.
52
Id. at 1434. The incongruity exists because the damages model was based on
all four causes of action the plaintiffs initially alleged. Justice Scalia relied on the
failure of the plaintiffs to adjust the damages model to fit the remaining cause of
action as indication that the Plaintiffs could not show that the remaining cause of
action resulted in an increase in cable rates.
53
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The
[damages model was] not intended to calculate damages, but instead to construct an
estimated competitive “but-for” Philadelphia market (a market absent the alleged
anticompetitive market). . . . In other words, the model calculates supra-competitive
prices regardless of the type of anticompetitive conduct.”).
54
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434–1435 (“The permutations involving four
theories of liability and 2 million subscribers located in 16 counties are nearly
endless.”).
51
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2. Justice Ginsburg pens a sharp dissent, joined by Justices
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagen
Justice Ginsburg began the Rule 23 discussion in her dissent by
dismissing the possibility that the majority opinion should be read as
breaking new ground on the predominance question.55 Nonetheless,
Justice Ginsburg did not quibble with the majority’s conclusion that
the “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members.”56
The dissent took issue with the idea that damages stemming
from a classwide injury must be measurable on a classwide basis.57
The dissent pointed to a long line of cases that stand for the
proposition that “individual damages calculations do not preclude
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”58 Most notably, the dissent
pointed to Amchem Products v. Windsor, decided only sixteen years
earlier, where the Court held exactly the opposite of the majority’s
ruling in Comcast.59
To distinguish this case from the typical antitrust
predominance issue, the dissent pointed to the unique procedural
posture of the case. Here, the case was originally granted certiorari on
the question of “[w]hether a district court may certify a class action
without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible
evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is
susceptible to awarding damages on a classwide basis.”60 Based on
this question, the parties’ briefing and oral arguments focused on the
admissibility of expert testimony – a question that was not addressed
in the majority’s opinion.61
55

Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1437 (citing a “legion” of appellate court decisions).
59
Id. (“Predominance is a test readily met in actions alleging violations of the
antitrust laws.”) (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625
(1997)).
60
Id. at 1435.
61
Id. at 1435–36.
56
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The majority, instead, rephrased the question as to whether
certification was proper where the plaintiffs had failed to establish
damages could be measured on a classwide basis.62 This, the dissent
noted, is “both unwise and unfair” because the respondents could not
“train their energies” on the separate issue of whether they had
satisfied the predominance requirement with their expert testimony.63
3. The take-away: what does the decision mean for the future
of the ability for classes to gain certification without the ability
to prove classwide damages?
What the district and circuit courts should take away from this
opinion is not quite clear. The majority’s opinion focuses on the lower
courts’ failing to inquire deeply enough into the merits of the damages
model, which the Court found to be legally insufficient to determine
classwide damages.64 But the dissent correctly identified a reluctance,
at least at the circuit court level, to deny class certification where
individual damages calculation is necessary, particularly in the
antitrust context.65
A fair reading of the case points to the need for district courts
to conduct a “rigorous analysis that the prerequisites” of Rule 23 have
been satisfied.66 Thus, district courts should not hesitate to look
beyond the pleadings to the merits, where doing so is necessary to
determine whether class certification should be granted. As Justice
Scalia notes, granting of class certification is a departure from the
62

Id. at 1431, n.4 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–33 (majority opinion).
65
Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen adjudication of questions of
liability common to the class will achieve economies of time and expense, the
predominance standard is generally satisfied even if damages are not provable in the
aggregate . . . [p]redominance is a test readily met in actions alleging violations of
the antitrust laws.”) (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625
(1997)).
66
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432 (majority opinion).
63
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ordinary structure of civil litigation, and thus requires an “affirmative
demonstrat[ion]” of worthiness.67
The real question that arises is not whether courts need to look
beyond the pleadings, but what kind of proof is required to
demonstrate predominance. The Court makes clear that if a damages
model is not reflective of the theories of liability and the relief sought,
the model is an insufficient basis for Rule 23(b)(3) class
certification.68 The issue, though, is that the Court did not explicitly
overturn Amchem or the generally accepted notion that individual
determinations of damages do not foreclose the possibility of class
certification.69
Various lower courts have addressed the issue head-on
including the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
since the Court handed down its decision in March 2013. The Seventh
Circuit also addressed this issue in Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co. II,
when the Court remanded Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co. I for
reconsideration in light of Comcast Corp. v. Behrend.70
67

Id.
Id. at 1433.
69
See Advisory Committee’s 1996 Notes on Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 28 U.S.C.App.
141; 7AA Wright, Miller & Kane Federal Practice and Procedure § 1781, 235–37; 2
W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:54, 205 (5th ed. 2012) (ordinarily,
“individual damage[s] calculations should not scuttle class certification under Rule
23(b)(3)”). Legions of appellate decisions across a range of substantive claims are
illustrative. See, e.g., Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (Fourth
Amendment); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273 (3d Cir. 2004) (Equal Credit
Opportunity Act); Bertulli v. Independent Assn. of Continental Pilots, 242 F.3d 290,
298 (5th Cir. 2001) (Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and Railway
Labor Act); Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 564–566 (6th Cir. 2007)
(Federal Communications Act); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 801 (7th Cir.
2008) (Eighth Amendment). Antitrust cases, which typically involve common
allegations of antitrust violation, antitrust impact, and the fact of damages, are classic
examples. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124,
139–140 (2d Cir. 2001). See also 2A P. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp, R. Blair, & C.
Durrance, Antitrust Law ¶ 331, 56 (3d ed. 2007); 6 A. Conte & H. Newberg,
Newberg on Class Actions § 18:27, 91 (4th ed. 2002).
70
727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013).
68
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PART II. BUTLER V. SEARS, ROEBUCK, AND COMPANY AND HOW THE
CASE CAME TO PROMINENCE

A. The plaintiffs file suit and seek class certification
Class representatives Susan Munch, Larry Butler, Joseph
Leonard, and Victor Matos originally filed suit in December 2006
against Sears, Roebuck, and Co. [“Sears”] on behalf of similarly
situated purchasers of various Kenmore Elite high-efficiency washing
machines.71 The named representatives alleged various claims
including violation of state consumer protection laws, common law
fraud, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability.72 Their
complaint alleged that each plaintiff had purchased a Kenmore
washing machine in 2004 or 2005 and had, in short order, began
experiencing mechanical issues, mechanical failure, clothes not being
cleaned, stains occurring during the washing process, and mold and
mildew growing inside the machines.73
After the initial causes of action were dismissed, the plaintiffs
amended their complaint to allege two major defects: electronic
control board failure and water drainage failure. Sears again moved to
dismiss in November 2007.74 Plaintiffs realleged the state consumer
fraud claims, an unjust enrichment claim, and sought declaratory relief
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.75 The court
again dismissed the state consumer fraud act claims, the unjust
enrichment claim, and the § 2201 claim as to marketing and unlawful
gains from extended warranties, but denied dismissal for the § 2201
claim for failure to honor its two-year warranty.76
71

Munch v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 2007 WL 2461660 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Id. at 1.
73
Id.
74
Munch v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., Nos. 06 C 7023, 07 C 412, 2008 WL
4450307, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
75
Id.
76
Id.
72
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The final version of the complaint alleged breach of warranty
for two separate classes of plaintiffs: those whose machines suffered
from the mold defect and those whose machines suffered from the
control board failure.77
B. The Northern District of Illinois rules on class certification; both
parties appeal
The district court was asked to certify two separate classes:
mold plaintiffs and control board plaintiffs.78 While finding no issue
with certifying the control board plaintiffs’ class, the court carefully
considered the mold plaintiffs’ claims in light of the predominance
requirement under Rule 23(b)(3).79
Recognizing that the plaintiffs claimed the mold problem stems
from a common defect with the machines that renders them unable to
clean themselves, the court noted that Sears had taken several remedial
steps to fix the mold issue.80 Finding that neither the plaintiffs’ expert
nor the plaintiffs’ themselves have accounted for how these remedial
steps have impacted the mold growth in the machines, the court held
that the issue is model dependent and not as pervasive as the plaintiffs
allege.81 Thus, because the mold issues are model-specific and depend
on Sears’ knowledge of ongoing issues with the machines, the court
found that the common issues do not predominate over the common
questions and denied certification.82 Notably, the court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that the predominance inquiry employed requires
an improper finding on the merits that is more appropriately left until
after certification has been granted or denied.83
77

Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., No. 06-cv-7023, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157499, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
78
Id.
79
Id. at *14–16.
80
Id. at *16.
81
Id. at *17.
82
Id.
83
Id. (“The court notes that in the Seventh Circuit, preliminary inquiries into
the facts and merits are appropriate in reviewing the predominance of common
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C. The Seventh Circuit makes its initial ruling
The case first came before the Seventh Circuit on a Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(f) motion for an interlocutory appeal by
both parties from the Northern District of Illinois’ decision to deny
class certification as to the mold issue and to grant certification in part
as to the defective control unit issue.84 The court’s determination
centered on the predominance question under FRCP 23(b)(3) and
looked to whether the district court incorrectly denied class
certification as to the mold issue.85 The first issue was whether there
was a common question concerning the predisposition of the machines
to develop an odorous mold due to their design.86 The court found that,
despite Sears’ claim that they sold twenty-seven different types of
Kenmore machines over the period in question, only five of the
various changes that Whirlpool, the machines’ manufacturer, made
were related to the mold issue. Thus, the common question––whether
the machines were defective in permitting the growth of mold––is
common to all parties.87 The only issue requiring individual
determination was the amount of damages owed.88
The second issue was whether the court had correctly granted
class certification for the defective control unit claims. The crux of the
complaint is that Sears knew about a defect during manufacture of the
control boards yet continued to manufacture machines with defective
boards and charge customers with defective machines hundreds of
dollars to fix the defect.89 The court, again, found a common question
in whether the control boards were indeed defective and that the only
issues for certification purposes.”) (citing Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249
F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2001)).
84
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 702 F.3d 359, 361 (7th. Cir. 2013).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 363.
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issue requiring individual determination was that of harm suffered by
the class members.90
Finding that there were common questions among all class
members, the court found that the claims predominated over the
individual damages claims and were sufficient to warrant class
certification with the caveat that the district court may wish to create
subclasses depending on the specific model of washing machine or the
state in which the class member resided to comply with state law.91
The Seventh Circuit denied Sears’ petition to rehear the case en banc
in December 2012.92
D. Petition for Certiorari and the Supreme Court’s involvement
Following the Seventh Circuit’s decision, Sears petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari.93 The Supreme Court in a memorandum
opinion vacated the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case
for review in consideration of the Court’s recent decision in Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend.94
E. The Seventh Circuit’s rehearing on remand
The Seventh Circuit framed the issue on remand as an issue of
law: “whether the Comcast decision cut the ground out from under our
decision ordering that the two classes be certified.”95 With this in
mind, Judge Posner, writing for the unanimous court, evaluated the
implication that Comcast has on the court’s ruling in Sears I.96 Judge
Posner argued that the Comcast holding is simply that “a damages suit
90

Id.
Id. at 362-63.
92
Id.
93
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 2013 WL
768586, (No. 12-1067).
94
Sears, Roebuck, and Co. v. Butler, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (mem.).
95
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. II, 727 F.3d 796, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).
96
Id. at 799.
91
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cannot be certified as a class action unless the damages sought are the
result of classwide injury that the suit alleges.”97 Thus, the Court’s
ultimate rule is that a damages model that does not identify damages
that are the result of the wrong is insufficient to warrant class
certification.98
Judge Posner applied this broadly: washing machine mold
class members only seek damages attributable to mold while control
unit class members only seek damages attributable to the control unit
defect.99 He went on to distinguish this case factually from the
Comcast decision. In Comcast, the district court attempted to
determine damages on a classwide basis; not so in this case.100 Rule
23(c)(4)101 permits the segregation of issues so that classes can move
forward solely on the common issues that predominate while
maintaining the individual issues unique to specific class members for
separate resolution.102
Rejecting the damages determination as the rationale for the
Court’s decision to remand, Judge Posner proceeded to the evidentiary
requirements Comcast emphasized are necessary to prevent class
litigation from proceeding where individual issues actually
predominate.103
The court rejected Sears’ argument that the district court’s
analysis was not sufficiently thorough to satisfy the Comcast
requirement and holds that individual damages need not be identical
across all class members to satisfy predominance.104 This standard, the
97

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
99
Id. at 800.
100
Id.
101
“Particular Issues. When appropriate, an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(4).
102
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. II, 727 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2013). See
also Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendment of Rule 23(b)(3); Pella Corp.
v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 393–94 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
103
Sears II, 727 F.3d at 800.
104
Id. at 801.
98
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court argued, would effectively spell the death knell of class
certification and is far afield from what the Supreme Court held in
Comcast.105
The court concludes by reinstating its November 13, 2012,
order granting class certification:
There is a single, central, common issue of
liability: whether the Sears washing machine was
defective. Two separate defects are alleged, but
remember that this class action is really two class
actions. In one the defect alleged involves mold, in the
other the control unit. Each defect is central to liability.
Complications arise from the design changes and from
separate state warranty laws, but can be handled by the
creation of subclasses.106
Sears subsequently petitioned for, and was denied certiorari.107
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY NARROWED THE APPLICABILITY
OF COMCAST TO CLASSES SEEKING CLASSWIDE DAMAGES
A. A brief analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s PostComcast Predominance Jurisprudence
To understand the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Comcast
v. Behrend, it is necessary to look at how the court has interpreted
predominance in three recent decisions: Sears II; Parko v. Shell Oil
Co.;108 and Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. & Assocs. V. Turza.109 In each of
these cases, the Seventh Circuit was faced with determining whether
the district court below had correctly ruled on whether the common
105

Id.
Id. at 801–02.
107
Sears, Roebuck, and Co. v. Butler, 2014 WL 684064 (2014).
108
739 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2014).
109
728 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2013).
106
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issues predominated over the class. These rulings establish the
contours of the Seventh Circuit’s predominance jurisprudence
following Comcast.
In each case, the court applies the same rule from Comcast
regarding the necessity of a damages model to fit the theory of
liability. In Sears II, the court distinguished between the classes here
and the class in Comcast on both factual and legal grounds.110
Interestingly, while holding that predominance requires a review of the
merits, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the notion that “a class
action limited to determining liability on a classwide basis, with
separate hearings to determine . . . the damages of the individual class
members” does not satisfy predominance.111 This is contrary to the
Comcast ruling where Justice Scalia implicitly rejected the notion that
a class should be granted Rule 23(b)(3) certification where damages
have to be calculated individually.112
In Sears II, Judge Posner maneuvered around this point of
contention by focusing on factual and procedural distinctions between
the cases. Judge Posner relied on two basic distinctions. First, the
plaintiffs in Comcast “fail[ed] to base all the damages they sought on
the . . . injury of which the plaintiffs were complaining,” which was
not so in Sears II. Second, the district court in Sears II was not asked
to determine damages on a classwide basis, unlike Comcast.113
The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion is clear when viewed through
the lens of the other two, much more clear-cut, cases mentioned above.
In Ira Holtzman, the court determined the validity of a district
court’s granting of class certification to a class of plaintiffs who had
received fax-based solicitation in violation of the Telephone Consumer
110

Sears II, 727 F.3d at 800.
Id.
112
Justice Scalia foreclosed the notion, and the dissent spent significant time
arguing against the idea, that a class action could proceed without a method for
determining classwide liability by reversing the decision of the lower courts instead
of simply holding the damages model as insufficient to base classwide adjudication
of the antitrust impact.
113
Sears II, 727 F.3d at 800.
111

254

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014

21

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 2

Spring 2014

Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227.114 Deciding that the Comcast
case was inapposite to the facts at issue, the court pointed to the
statutory remedy that allows easily calculable damages for each
member of the plaintiff class.115 The court concluded that an easily
calculable remedy, such as the statutorily available remedy available
to the class members here, was completely distinguishable from the
facts in Comcast.116 While in Comcast, the majority feared that
individual calculation of damages would subsume the common
issues,117 here there is no fear that the common questions of law or fact
would not predominate over individual determination of damages.118
Importantly, the damages available are not simply a matter of
dividing a pot of money among all of the class members; rather, the
class members would all have to prove they have actually received the
faxes at issue.119 Once the court determined the receipt of the faxes
and the number received, the calculation of damages would simply be
the product of the number of faxes received and the statutory damages
permitted.120 Because the calculation of damages, though needing
individual determination, would require nothing more than multiplying
the number of faxes received by the amount of statutory damages
available, the defendant’s liability to the group as a whole easily
predominated over individual issues.121
Finally, in Parko v. Shell Oil Co. decided in January 2014, the
Seventh Circuit, for the first time since Comcast, rejected class
certification based on the district court’s improper finding of
predominance.122 Here, the plaintiffs sought class certification to
pursue claims against various defendants for allegedly leaking
114

Id. at 683.
Id. at 684.
116
Id.
117
Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013).
118
Ira Holtzman, C.P.A., & Assocs. v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir.
2013).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1084 (7th Cir. 2014).
115
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“benzene and other contaminants into the groundwater under the class
members’ homes.”123 The Seventh Circuit rejected class certification,
finding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to prove that
common questions would predominate over the class because a
determination of liability and damages would require individual, rather
than classwide evaluation.124 The court found that even assuming the
plaintiffs could survive the threshold Rule 23(a) requirements,
damages would have to be determined individually based on the
diminution in property value each class member has suffered.125 The
court further pointed to the inability of the residents to exclude any
other cause for the loss in property value or to even fix causation on
the alleged groundwater contamination.126
Taking these cases together, the Seventh Circuit has clearly
defined the predominance inquiry in the post-Comcast world. With
Sears II and Holtzman, the court has defined the two areas where
classes will be able to achieve class certification under FRCP 23(b)(3):
1) where the class bifurcates the damages question from liability such
as in Sears II; and 2) where the class seeks determination of classwide
damages but damages are susceptible to such a determination, such as
in Holtzman. On the other side of the coin, the court defined when
classes will not achieve class certification through Parko: where the
determination of damages requires individualized inquiry into the
harm caused by the defendants.
These cases provide district courts with a clear picture of what
putative classes should be granted certification and which would run
afoul of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Comcast. Indeed, the Northern
District of Illinois and the Northern District of Indiana have already
taken up the question of whether class certification is appropriate
based on the Court’s decision in Comcast. In seven district court cases,

123

Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1087.
125
Id. at 1086.
126
Id.
124
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only two putative classes failed to achieve class certification.127 The
rest of the cases relied on a broad reading of the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis in Sears II and distinguished the Supreme Court’s reasoning
on the facts of Comcast.128
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion Properly Applied
Comcast to Plaintiffs Seeking Class Certification
Numerous scholars predicted the Comcast decision would
result in a reduction of courts granting class certification.129 While it is
127

Tamas v. Family Video Movie Club, Inc., No. 11 C 1024, 2013 WL
4080649, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Harris v. Reliable Reports, Inc., No. 1:13–CV–210
JVB, 2014 WL 931070, at *9 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (“[I]t would be premature to strike
Harris’s class . . . when no discovery has been undertaken.”).
128
Fox v. Riverview Realty Partners, No. 12 C 9350, 2014 WL 1613022, at *6
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (relying on a class of only 100 members (compared to the two
million members of the Comcast case) and a “mechanical” damages calculation);
Kurgan v. Chiro One Wellness Centers LCC, Case No. 10–cv–1899, 2014 WL
642092, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (relying on the statutory structure of the Illinois
Minimum Wage Law to find that adjudication of liability would “aid in resolving
damages” and the manageability of their determination); Reliable Reports, 2014 WL
931070, at *9 (relying on Espenscheid v. Directsat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 776
(7th Cir. 2013) for the proposition that “the district court must carefully explore the
possible ways of overcoming problems in calculating individual damages.”); Driver
v. AppleIllinois, LLC, Case No. 06 C 6149, 2013 WL 5818899, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (“Applying Comcast as expansively as Smith suggests would virtually
prohibit class certification in wage and hour cases . . . There is no indication
in Comcast that the Court intended to undo the 67 years of decisions setting FLSA
damages under the burden-shifting framework of Mt. Clemens.”); Healey v. Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 134, 296 F.R.D. 587, 594–95 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (distinguishing Comcast on the fact that this case only has forty class
members and that some damages-related issues are common to the class); Tamas,
2013 WL 4080649 at *9 (finding that plaintiffs had not sufficiently proven that the
liability issues predominated); Harris v. comScore, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 579, 589 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (“[I]ndividual factual damages issues do not provide a reason to deny class
certification when the harm to each plaintiff is too small to justify resolving the suits
individually.”).
129
See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 23, at 480; Ellen Meriwether, Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend: Game Changing or Business as Usual?, 27-SUM ANTITRUST 57,
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likely too soon to tell whether the doom-and-gloom future for class
actions will come to fruition, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Sears II
keeps that concern at bay.
First, if we look at the Seventh Circuit’s predominance
jurisprudence before the High Court handed down its opinion in
Comcast, it is apparent that very little, if anything, has changed.130 In
Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, the Seventh Circuit recognized in
the (b)(3) context that where calculation of damages is “mechanical,
formulaic, a task not for a trier of fact but for a computer program” the
court need not deny class certification.131 Similarly, in Messner v.
Northshore University Health System, the Seventh Circuit vacated and
remanded a district court’s denial of class certification for a putative
(b)(3) class of antitrust plaintiffs.132 In a case very similar to the facts
of Comcast, the Seventh Circuit held that proof of “uniformity of price
increases” was a bridge too far to achieve class certification.133
57 (2013) (“[W]hile the holding of the case within its factual context provides little
support for a conclusion that the decision has significantly altered the class
certification landscape, certain of the Court's comments may provide fodder for
defense arguments that plaintiffs must offer a damages model capable of proving
damages for individual class members.”); Klonoff, supra note 3, at 799–800 (“It
remains to be seen whether Comcast will now cause lower courts to depart from the
traditional rule that individualized damages issues normally do not defeat class
certification. Courts and commentators are already divided on what the impact of the
case will be.”); Campos, supra note 48.
130
See, e.g., Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir.
2013) (decided one month before Comcast); Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391,
394 (7th Cir. 2010) (three years before Comcast); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788,
801 (7th Cir. 2008) (five years before Comcast).
131
705 F.3d at 773.
132
669 F.3d 802, 819 (7th Cir. 2012).
133
Id. This case is an interesting counterexample to Comcast and is worth
much greater consideration on its own merits. Suffice it to say, the case is factually
distinguishable from Comcast on the basic point that defendants did not challenge
the congruity of the injury alleged with the damages sought, only that the damages
would require individual calculation. In this way, Messner is very much like the
Holtzman case discussed supra where uniformity of damages is not necessary to
satisfy the predominance inquiry. See Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. & Assocs. v. Turza, 728
F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 2013).
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Further, the court upheld certification for a bifurcated trial where
individual trials would be held to determine causation and damages for
each class member while the court would determine the common issue
of defect in certain models of Pella windows.134 Finally, the court
noted the flexibility district courts have with class certification when it
held that despite variances in each class member’s personal damages,
“judges can devise solutions to address that problem if there are
substantial common issues that outweigh the single variable of
damages amounts.”135
Thus, the Seventh Circuit has correctly not changed the tune
that “Rule 23 allows district courts to devise imaginative solutions to
problems created by the presence . . . of individual damages issues.”136
The court will continue to grant class certification where damages are
not subject to classwide determination. Instead of foregoing 23(b)(3)
classes or creating an increased barrier to entry, the court relied on the
mechanism in Rule 23(c)(4) to limit classes to liability, while
reserving individual determination of damages for a later day.
The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion plainly fits within the
limiting language both the dissent and the majority employed in their
respective opinions.137 Comcast has truly broken no new ground for
classes seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3), both in the Seventh
Circuit and for each circuit to have considered the issue. For example
the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits all held, following Comcast, that
bifurcation of the liability and damages questions renders the Comcast
ruling inapplicable.138 Further, the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits
134

Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010).
Arreola, 546 F.3d at 801.
136
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
137
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (“We start with an
unremarkable premise. If respondents prevail on their claims, they would be entitled
only to damages resulting from reduced overbuilder competition.”). Id. at 1436
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he opinion breaks no new ground on the standard for
certifying a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).”).
138
See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 817 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he rule of Comcast is largely irrelevant where
determinations of liability and damages have been bifurcated in accordance with
135
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agree that predominance may still be satisfied where individual
calculations of damages are necessary.139 Only two circuits, the Eighth
and the Eleventh, have considered predominance without applying
Comcast to the facts; both courts denied certification because the
plaintiffs could not successfully prove any common issue
predominated.140
In short, the Seventh Circuit has considerable support in
refusing to depart from the common understanding that “individual
damages calculations do not preclude class certification under Rule
23(b)(3).141 Despite the concerns of academics and commentators, and
the current Supreme Court trend to heighten class action prerequisites,
the Seventh Circuit has put Comcast Corp. v. Behrend in its rightful
place: the case clarifies the district court’s need to investigate the
merits of class certification and to require congruence between the
Rule 23(c)(4).”); Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d 838, 860 (6th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“Where determinations on liability and damages
have been bifurcated . . . the decision in Comcast . . . has limited application.”);
Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213,
1220 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that individualized damages do not destroy class
certification where a class may be certified for liability purposes only and leaving
damages for individual proceedings).
139
See Catholic Health Care West v. U.S. Foodserv., 729 F.3d 108, 122 (2d
Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause the question whether the invoices materially misrepresented
the amounts due to [defendant] is common to all plaintiffs, the class will prevail or
fail in unison on this point––rendering certification appropriate.”); Leyva v. Medline
Indus., 716 F.3d 510, 513–14 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he presence of individualized
damages cannot, by itself, defeat class certification.”); In re Rail Freight Fuel
Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, 725 F.3d 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (common
evidence must show all the class members were actually harmed by the alleged
wrongdoing, but not necessarily the amount of damages incurred).
140
Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 2013)
(rejecting class certification where questions of liability would require individual
inquiries and “will predominate over whether Auto-Owners’s process was
reasonable and overwhelm questions common to the class.”); Bussey v. Macon
County Greyhound Park, Inc., No. 13–12733, ___ Fed.Appx. ____, 2014 WL
1302658, at *6 (11th Cir. 2014) (reversing the district court’s grant of class
certification for failure to conduct a “rigorous analysis”).
141
Comcast, 133 S.Ct. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

260

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014

27

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 2

Spring 2014

injury alleged and the damages model before predominance is
satisfied.
IV. CONCLUSION
What we can take away from the Seventh Circuit’s
jurisprudence is that not much has changed, as the Comcast dissent
correctly predicted.142 When the Supreme Court decided Comcast in
2013, an overwhelming majority of scholars predicted that Rule 23
had been forever altered. Professor John Campbell, at the University
of Denver, predicted that “many meritorious claims will either never
get started, die on the vine, or, even if they do succeed, provide relief
to a more narrowly drawn class.”143 Others have similarly chimed in,
fretting over the future of class action litigation.144
The Court, perhaps unintentionally, provided myriad reasons
for these prognosticators to wring their hands. Not the least of which
was changing the question presented after the parties had briefed the
issues, rejecting the prêt à porter145 Daubert issue in exchange for the
unchallenged predominance question.146 If these commentators had
stepped back from the decision for a moment, they would have
understood the narrowness of Justice Scalia’s opinion. Most notably,
the Court made no attempt to backpedal from Amchem Products v.
Windsor, nor does the Court attempt to establish any new rule of law.
Despite the bend-over-backwards approach the Court used to reach
this question,147 Comcast’s biggest contribution to the predominance
jurisprudence is clarification of certain principles already generally
accepted in the circuit and district courts.148
142

Id. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Campbell, supra note 23, at 480.
144
See, e.g., Meriwether, supra 129, at 57; Klonoff, supra note 3, at 799–800.
145
Ready to wear.
146
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147
It would make sense if the Court reached to address this question.
148
Including the requirement of the district court to “look beyond the
pleadings” to perform a rigorous analysis to determine whether class certification
143
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And the Seventh Circuit agrees.
Through the Sears II decision, the court makes clear that the
predominance requirements have not meaningfully changed with the
Comcast decision. Had Comcast meant what the commentators had
predicted, the Seventh Circuit could have relied on the district court’s
reasoning and held that common proof of damages for class members
is required and rejected certification.149 Plainly, the Seventh Circuit
refused to do so.
Moreover, the reasoning in Sears II is consistently applied
through the court’s decisions in Holtzman and Palko, indicating that
the Sears II conclusion is not an aberration. Finally, the decisions of
the district courts within the Seventh Circuit and the other circuit
courts strengthen the weight of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. There
does not seem to be a court within the Seventh Circuit, district or
circuit, nor a circuit court in the country that agrees with the doomand-gloom outlook peddled in early 2013.
Moving forward, the question will be to what degree the
Supreme Court is satisfied with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning. The
Court’s denial of certiorari for Sears II suggests that the Seventh
Circuit’s decision is in line with what Justice Scalia advocated. Yet the
recent history of the Supreme Court’s Rule 23 jurisprudence intimates
otherwise. Thus, one must ask, will the Supreme Court fall in line with
its decisions in Walmart and AT&T Mobility to further constrain
consumers rights under Rule 23? Or does the Court’s decision in
Comcast mark a degree of satisfaction with where class action law
stands today? Sears II may well be the key to answering that question.

should be granted; the need for common issues to predominate over individual
issues; and that common liability issues cannot predominate where damages for over
two million class members would have to have damages calculated individually. See
generally id. (majority opinion).
149
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co. II, 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013).
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